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Book Reviews 
Tbe Sacred River: Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination by James V. Baker. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957. Pp. xiv + 308. $4.50. 
Writers are inclined to pontificate a little hastily upon Coleridge's aesthetics; 
it is good to have a book by a scholar who has spent years saturating himself in 
his subject. In focussing upon the theory of imagination, Professor Baker has 
gone to the heart of the matter. He emphasizes three aspects: imagination as 
organic, imagination as reconciling opposites, and imagination developing in the 
unconscious before emerging into consciousness. In these three seminal ideas 
he has seen the underlying unity, the Coleridgean one in the many. Rene Wellek 
in a tone of mild disparagement has tenned Coleridge's criticism eclectic and 
unsystematic; amidst the diversity, the persistent reliance upon this trinity of 
related ideas righdy commands attention. 
Professor Baker's exposition is richly laden. All the relevant writers of the 
Romantic and earlier periods are quoted and discussed: the Germans are not 
neglected for the English or vice-versa; Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus fit into 
their places. The study looks after as well as before, to the many later develop-
ments in thought which Coleridge anticipated. These many glancings give the 
book an authentic density. Nearly all of the ground has already been gone over 
in one way or another and much will be familiar to specialists. But the tight 
collocation of ideas from so many writers into a systematic presentation serves as 
a useful review, renews old awarenesses, and suggests new ones. 
For example, Baker's detailed scrutiny of the eighteenth-century mechanists, 
against whose passive view of the mind Coleridge waged relentless war, reveals 
how often these men were forced to recognize a creative element in cognition. 
Even the arch-enemy, the sceptical Hume, was aware of the creative role of 
imagination-though, like his successor 1. A. Richards, he might have been little 
interested in Akenside's and Coleridge's conviction that imagination in its highest 
potency offered intimations of the supernatural. Baker righdy notes that Cole-
ridge'S polemical zeal against mechanism, the result of his religious commitments, 
sometimes throws his criticism a little off balance. It accounts for his excessive 
disparagement of "fancy" and "association," for his perhaps too sharp cleavage 
between "fancy" and "imagination," and for his occasional failure to recognize 
the creativity of unconscious association. 
Two chapters of special interest are those on the unconscious and on modern 
critical views of Coleridge. In the first are included Coleridge's interesting obser-
vations on dreams; also, in discussing Freud, Baker makes the point that Freud 
and Coleridge are both alike rationalists in the great Western tradition. In looking 
through the other chapter a reader might conclude that when a modern critic 
comments on Coleridge he reveals as much about himself as about his subject, or 
perhaps more. Baker is usually on the side of his Ancient when he feels a Modern 
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has misunderstood or disparaged. Yet he is never blindly partisan. He believes 
Eliot's emphasis upon conscious workmanship in art is a necessary corrective to 
some of Coleridge's ideas. Here it may be noted that conscious workmanship 
is not the absolute opposite of that less conscious creation of genius which 
Coleridge was fond of extolling. Even in the midst of a deliberate effort to solve 
an intellectual or artistic problem, the right unification can still come suddenly, 
as though the final fitting together has occurred one Imows not quite how. 
A book usually has the defects of its qualities. Amid his dozens of citations 
from other writers, Professor Baker does not always drive his own point home. 
He believes that too sharp a distinction between fancy and imagination should 
not be drawn; he quotes Coleridge'S example of merely fanciful verse from 
Butler's Hudibras: 
And like a lobster boyl'd the Morn 
From black to red began to turn. 
Would it not be possible to come right out and say that when considering such 
a passage it is manifestly wrong to talk, as Coleridge does, of the simile and its 
referents as "fixities" and "definites"; to deny that they interact vitally? In 
their humble way these lines exhibit just that sort of interanimation or mutual 
modification which Coleridge thought the imagination should bring to pass: 
the grotesque figure imparts some of its tone to the morning and to the poem 
as a whole; the poem gives some of its own vigor to the figure. 
In a still more important matter Professor Baker might himself have taken a 
little stronger hand in presenting his subject. He believes that when 1. A. Richards 
adopted Coleridge's critical ideas but discarded his metaphysical assumptions, 
he was discarding the very element that gave these ideas their intelligible unity. 
Out of proper respect for his own opinion and for Coleridge's. he might have 
presented his reasons, if not in twenty pages, at least in four or five. Baker has 
offered a clue when he insists that Coleridge regarded the imagination as symbolic. 
But precisely because the term symbol has become a shibboleth in modern 
criticism, it is dangerous for an author to be too polite, to assume that of course 
his readers know precisely what he means when he uses the term. A reader 
without a strong grounding in idealistic philosophy might well feel that all 
the materials have been assembled here to demonstrate the unity of three of 
Coleridge's key ideas, but that the demonstration is never quite made. 
Professor Baker's deepest agreement with Coleridge appears to be religious, 
a fact which may partially explain his reticence. Again, the agreement is partly 
philosophic, if philosophy and religion can here be distinguished. Coleridge 
owed an early and a great debt to the older English and Greek idealists, but 
Baker believes, quite rightly, that he often found in the German tradition from 
Leibniz to Schelling the most distinct formulations of the ideas that were growing 
in his mind. Here, where even the heavily-armed Wellek has failed, Baker is 
understandably reluctant to launch another full-scale attack on the citadel of 
Anglo-Saxon impercipience; after all, T. S. Eliot himself stands on the battlements 
cheering on the defenders. 
Leibniz viewed all existence, physical and mental, as manifesting one vital 
process, essentially an image-making process, developing through successive phases; 
Schelling, in his own post-Kantian terms, viewed the world similarly. These 
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philosophies do not solve all difficulties, but theJ71 ct.mstitute an intellectual reduc-
tion as astounding in its way as that effected in our own time for the physical 
world by Alben Einstein; they were not only prophetic of changes to come but 
through their influence helped bring these changes to pass. One might even 
suggest that it was no accident that Einstein's successful quest for unity at a 
very high level of abstraction was achieved in the country of Leibniz and 
Schelling. An anti-metaphysical critic may point out truly enough that he makes 
his own discoveries with the help of Coleridge's humbler and more concrete 
observations, just as good work can still be done in the sciences without taking 
Einstein's theory into account. But these pragmatic facts do not invalidate the 
higher theories. In shorr, even after Copernican revolutions in thought many old 
categories and mental constructs can still be used fruitfully, and this fruitfulness 
does not prove the revolution to have been without significance. Here perhaps 
Baker is a little hasty when he suggests that Coletidge's old-fashioned "faculty-
psychology" is outmoded by his own organic theory of mind. In the words of 
John Donne, an idealistic metaphysic is a prince lying in prison until it descends 
to faculties. But after a revolution the old categories must on occasion be used 
with a difference, and Baker righdy notes that Coleridge sometimes forgets 
this difference. 
Although Professor Baker shows considerable familiarity with the Teutonic 
mysteries, his commentaries on them .are sometimes misleading. In considering 
the relevance of Immanuel Kant to the general subject, it is not enough to 
recount what Kant has to say upon the imagination; rlle philosopher usually 
employs this term in a limited sense only. One must consider all that is said 
in the first part of the Critique of Judgment about the beautiful as a symbol, 
about the organic unity of the creations of artistic genius perhaps intimating the 
existen~e of one "supersensible substrate" underlying the di~hotomous worlds 
of experience. Here Kant is talking about imagination in the full Coleridgean 
sense; here he finally reveals himself, for all his critical hedgings, to have been 
a crypto-Platonist after ali, secredy undermining the structure of modem 
scepticism from within. At least so his last critique was interpreted by his 
successors in Germany. 
Again, in writing on the distinction in the Biographia Literaria between the 
Primary and Secondary Imaginations, Baker seems to suggest that the primary 
imagination is a rather passive sort of poetic perception, as when Dorothy Words-
worth, without creating a fully formed poem in response to her experience, feels 
a birch tree to be a spirit. Unless I am mistaken on this recondite point, anything 
which common sense would regard as in the least "poetical" would be verging 
upon the domain of Coleridge's Secondary power. His Primary Imagination, 
as derived from Schelling, is simply the ability of rlle human mind to take its 
scattered and fragmentary sense perceptions and build these up into the matter-
of-fact world that it knows, of trees, houses, people, solid and substantial, existing 
in time and space. 
Related to this matter is one difficulty which recurs several times in the book. 
According to Coleridge'S own vitalistic theory, the mind is creative even in its 
unconscious workings. Yet Professor Baker sometimes may leave an unwary 
reader with the conviction that the Coleridgean distinction between active and 
passive is the same as that between conscious and unconscious. When Coleridge 
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is using the terms in the precise sense appropriate to his own theory, the distinc-
tions are different. Coleridge himself and the natural abstruseness of the subject 
are largely to blame if there is some confusion here. 
A few generations ago, in such men as Latta, Royce, and Watson, the EngIish-
speaking world produced lucid expositors of the German higher philosophies. 
These men could be profitably re-read today. This reviewer has no wish to 
suggest that metaphysics is the same as literary criticism, or that it sho~d 
displace literary criticism. Yet Professor Baker, after giving so much thought 
to his subject, believes that in Coleridge's case the lofty speculations liberated and 
enriched the more practical observations. It is still fashionable to maintain the 
contrary. But sometimes the very writers who express this opposite opinion 
admit that they are not truly acquainted with that metaphysic which they suppose 
to have been more a hindrance to Coleridge than a help. 
Southern Illinois University JAMES BENZIGER 
The Rational and Social Foundations of Music by Max Weber. Translated and 
edited by Don Martindale, Johannes Riedel, and Gertrude Neuwirth. Carbon-
dale, illinois: Southe,n illinois University Press, 1958. Pp. Iii + 148. $5.75. 
Max Weber's importance in present-day sociology can scarcely be exaggerated. 
Although his death occurred in 1920, his sociological studies, the major ones 
published posthumously, have still the impact of fresh and up-to-date thinking. 
Yet a search for contemporary American reviews of his monumental Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft (1921) reveals that the book was ignored; it seems safe to say 
that during his lifetime Weber was almost completely unknown on this side of 
the water. It is only during the last thirty years or so that his theoretical writings 
have been recognized by American sociologists as extremely fruitful and in many 
ways pertinent to the fundamental sociological problem of devising a conceptual 
apparatus in terms of which human social behavior may be comprehended. 
In these days of specialization the breadth of Weber's knowledge is amazing. 
His studies had apparendy no imposed limits of time or place, he was a synthesiz-
ing and comparative historian of economics, politics, jurisprudence, religion, mili~ 
tarism, society, and lmowledge. He viewed sociology as a kind of natural science 
that seeks to recognize regularities which may be stated as laws but that differs 
from other natural sciences in two important respects: in its concern with 
meaning and motivation in contrast to the lack of concern, for example, of 
chemistry with the personal values of a molecule of gas; and in its view of the 
laws of society, once derived, not as things in themselves but rather as instru-
ments by means of which the discovery of causal interrelationships of historical 
phenomena is facilitated. Weber's sociology is concerned with regularities in 
meaningful social action and, in contrast to modern sociological functionalism, 
find the reality of social systems to exist in the probabilities of occurrence of 
predicted social actions. 
In connection with the establishing of constructs by means of which to char-
" 
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acterize these stabilized patterns of social interaction, Weber perceived several 
qualitatively different themes, or motives, around which values and actions are 
organized. He calls the more important of these rational, evaluative, and tra-
ditional; all involve the relationship between means and ends in one way Of 
another, but the theme of "rationality" connotes, in Webcr'·s terms, complete 
freedom of choice of ends, while means are chosen purely for their efficiency; 
and the whole process entails a constant attempt to reduce everything to in-
flexible rules, laws, or conceptual models. It is Weber's contention-a leitmotif 
that runs through all his works-that Western Civilization alone of all the cultures 
of the world may be characterized by its great and continually increasing reliance 
on rational social action. 
In view of tllls background it is understandable that the publication of the 
first English translation of Weber's essay on The Rational and Social Foundations 
of Music should be greeted with considerable enthusiasm by anyone interested 
in the sociology of music. The essay was apparently written in 1911 but was 
not published until 1921 when it appeared twice, once as a monograph and once 
as an appendix to Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. The present edition represents 
an attempt of Martindale, Riedel, and Neuwirth, all associated with the University 
of Minnesota, to give a wider audience to Weber's pioneering treatise. 
And, indeed, they seem to have done their best to make a book out of it. 
An extended introduction, a bit more than a third as long as the essay itself, 
gives information on Weber's ideas and attempts to explain the essay in terms 
of them. They have split the originally uninterrupted essay into seven chapters 
and assigned appropriate headings. They have provided extensive annotation, 
including many citations from the ethnomusicological literature since Weber's 
time. Yet the book as a whole is disappointing, for two reasons. First, the 
translation has a tendency to be literal. Weber's German was never easy to read, 
but this is no reason for the translators to render the essay almost unreadable 
in English. Their preference for English cognates of the German terms employed 
by Weber, rather than more familiar English words having the same mealllngs, 
results often in a kind of gibberish running completely counter to that rule of 
English-if not German-scholarly style demanding clarity, precision, and un-
equivocal communication of ideas. This is not to say that the meaning is not 
there; only that one has to fight for it far harder than he should be expected to, 
and often harder than the results justify. For example,: "By adding another 
third to a triad, dissonant seventh chords are formed. The most important is 
the dominant seventh chord built on the dominant of the key with its major 
seventh as the third which characterizes the key univocally since it appears only 
in this key and in this composition as a series of thirds made out of scalable tone 
material." Let us examine the second of these sentences. We find the words 
"univocally," "composition," and "scalable" here, each in its own way sub-
verting ready comprehension. For the first, "unequivocally," a much more 
common word, could have been used and, particularly in terms of Weber's 
discussion of "polyvocality," would have been less misleading. "Composition," 
in a musical context, inevitably suggests a musical work; the reader is thus quite 
likely to waste some time in trying to identify the particular composition-since 
one has not previously been mentioned-to which Weber is referring before 
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he realizes that in this case Webef is talking about the form of the chord. 
" Scalable" can be confusing until one understands that "scalable tone material" 
just means tones of the scale. With these three potential stumbling blocks out 
of the way the sentence is still not immediately clear, for the major seventh of 
the dominant of a key is certainly not" the third which characterizes the key," 
and since dominant seventh chords are under discussion the major seventh of 
the dominant is in any case irrelevant. Of course, it soon becomes evident that 
the major seventh of the key and the third of the dominant seventh chord arc 
meant, and that it is the entire dominant seventh chord which characterizes the 
key, and the passage makes sense. But the whole process is simply not worth 
the effort, particularly since the sentence is not very important. The passage 
just vivisected is, unfortunately, typical of the entire essay. It was Weber's 
privilege to w.rite in ambiguous fashion, and German scholars are to some extent 
used to this sort of thing. but a translator attempting to introduce Weber's work 
to an English-reading audience of sociologists and musicologists should do 
better than this. 
The second source of disappointment lies in the scope of the monograph itself, 
and in the manner in which Weber treats his material. His main thesis, that 
the peculiar rationalizing propensities of the Western world have resulted in 
a series of theoretical systems embracing tone, melody, and harmony that have, 
when made manifest in chordal harmony, standardized instruments, and a 
" rational" system of notation, permitted the development of musical works and 
musical styles more complex than those developed elsewhere-this thesis is never 
outspokenly developed. If the reader is not fairly familiar with Weber's other 
work he is likely to miss the point, since the editors' introduction only partly 
compensates for the lack of explicit orientation in the essay. To be sure, the 
erudition Weber displays is tremendous; he utilizes as examples a wealth of 
comparative historical material ranging from ancient Greek to modern Western 
music, and from Ewe and American Indian music to that of ancient and modem 
China and India. But it all amounts to a hodge-podge of miscellaneous informa-
cion that contributes little to the exposition of his central concept of rationalization, 
or "rule-making," as the major force in the development of Western music. 
The purely social, as against rational, foundations of music are sketchily treated; 
Weber merely mentions, in passing, some ways in which certain musical factors 
have been conditioned by specific social developments. Thus, the piano attained 
its importance because it made a nice middle-class article of furniture; sound-
box instruments developed in the West because "the handling of wood in the 
form of boards and all finer carpenter's and wooden inlay work is much more 
typical of Nordic peoples than those of the Orient"; and the technical develop-
ment of Western instruments is associated with organized musicians' guilds of 
thirteenth-century Europe. But one searches in vain for the systematic attempt 
to correlate social with musical values the title of the essay leads one to expect. 
The reader beginning this book with the respect for Weber his other works 
warrant is likely to be disturbed by the realization that, in constructing this 
essay, Weber has confused the music of the Western world with its musicology. 
This leads him to assert, for example, that the development of chordal harmony 
had to wait upon the invention of a "rational" notation system and to imply 
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consistently that rules somehow had priority over performance in Western 
music. Even if we grant Weber's point that Western musicology has gone 
fanher than other musicologies in tIying to make purely musical "sense" out 
of music, we are still faced with the fact that the conceptual models produced 
by the rationalized musicology of Western culture have bearing on the actual 
music only when these models or rules have been accepted by the people 
producing and experiencing the music, and even then only as there arise tendencies 
to perceive the complex phenomena of music in terms of the models and to 
force these phenomena to conform to the models. Western musicians, relatively 
or completely in ignorance of the model-building of the musicologists. neverthe-
less create and perform music that is undeniably Western in style, and Weber's 
implicit suggestion that the rules form the music must be rejected. 
Willie The Rational and Social Foundations of Music was undoubtedly a 
pioneering venture in the sociology of music, the editors' assertion that it "forms 
a test case as to the values of sociological and musicological sciences for each 
other" is happily not true. If it were, there would now be no sociology of music, 
for Weber failed in this treatise to indicate much connection between the subject 
matter of two disciplines. The real importance of this work lies not particularly 
in its content, but in the fact that one of the greatest of twentieth-century 
sociologists was willing to extend his researches into a realm of discourse that 
in 1911 was commonly considered far removed from the province of the social, 
political, and economic theorist. As an objective and comprehensive history of 
certain aspects of musicological theory it has value, to be sure, but to modern 
sociology of music it stands as forerunner rather than ancestor, and its historical 
significance resides not in its methodological or factual contributions to the field 
but in the bare circumstance of its existence. 
Wayne State University RICHARD A. WATERMAN 
Literature and Belief: Englisb Institute Essays 1957. Edited by M. H. Abrams. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Pp. xiii + 184. $3.75. 
It is hardly too much to say that the size of this small volume is in inverse ratio 
to the importance of its subject. The immediate question of how doctrine and 
value operate in literature takes us inevitably to further questions, ultimately to 
the fundamentals of literary structure and ontology. Though not until the 1920's 
explicitly mooted and named, by I. A. Richards, the" poetry and belief" problem 
is virtually coterminous with all literary criticism and, as Professor Abrams 
points out, implicit in the many "defenses" of poetry (whether so named or 
not) since Plato's attack. For these reasons alone it cannot be dismissed on 
the grounds of its probable insolubility. 
Six essays, with the editor's brief foreword, make up the book, four of them 
from a conference on the topic at the 1957 English Institute. Two additional 
studies by Professors Nathan A. Scott, Jr. and Louis L. Martz are from other 
Institute conferences held in 1956 and 1957 respectively. Those by Professors 
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Abrams, Scott, and Cleanth Brooks confront the issue in theoretical terms. 
Professor Martz provides a case study from the poet's viewpoint by examining 
Wallace Stevens' poetry after H armollium against his own statement that in a 
disbelieving age the poet must" supply the satisfactions of belief, in his measure 
and in his style." Aside from its explicative value, this essay is a happy inclusion. 
It shows that the belief problem is not one confined to works which embody 
readily paraphrasable ideas, but extends in subder forms even to so-called pure 
poetry, poetry" palpable and mute." 
For no poem, however" palpable" or, as Ransom has it, "physical," can he 
really mute. Every created object, Father Walter J. Ong argues, is a word. It 
shows thought, something true a fortiori of a poem since "it is not only, as a 
totality, a word, but the stuff of which it is compounded is words" (p. 82). 
Father Gng's essay will disappoint those who seek some critical modus vivendi 
with poems whose predicates seem too overt for mere mythical acceptance, 
where reader disbelief can be suspended only at the cost of some impoverishment 
of the total aesthetic experience. He largely compensates for deliberately neglect-
ing this central dilemma by discriminating between belief that and belief in, 
belief as opinion and belief as faith. Behind the objective fonn of his creation, 
his "mask," lies the writer's "voice," summoning us to an act of faith that does 
not necessarily require assent to the propositional details of its structure. " If 
we cannot believe in Prospero as a real magician, we can believe that the play-
wright is using him to convey some further word or truth to us" (p. 103). 
But what kind of "truth"? There seems small comfort in Father Gng's admis-
sion that it "may be a very mysterious matter" (p. 102). But his argument is 
more than a discerning restatement of aesthetic distance in existential terms. 
It amply fulfils his aims: "to improve our perspectives and to reveal how limited 
some of our common views of this problem really are" (p. 93). That these 
aims are worthwhile is clear when we reflect that such pseudo-solutions as 
Richards' "pseudo-statements" arise mainly from the crudely reductive way in 
which the problem has frequendy been formulated. 
Professor Douglas Bush, who seems in strange company here and confesses 
that he does not "breathe easily in the rarified air of aesthetic theory" (p.33), 
modestly confines himself to inquiring how far the non-Christian reader can 
II apprehend and assimilate" the essentially Christian poetry of the past. Since 
Professor Bush himself can hardly be considered unsympathetic to Christian 
values, let alone critically insensitive, nothing could more eloquently demonstrate 
the complex embarrassments of the belief question than his profession of limited 
response to Crashaw, to Donne's Holy Sonnets, and to Hopkins' "terrible" ones. 
That he finds it otherwise <as do his students) with Herbert, Milton, and the 
Eliot of Four Quartets he ascribes to their possessing an "experiential validity," 
a "truth to life," recognizable even by non-believing readers (p. 41). On much 
the·same grounds Professor Abrams downgrades Blake's prophetic poems, Gide's 
Counterfeiters, Lawrence's Aaron's Rod, and that most recent challenge to aes-
thetic tolerance, Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita. These come short of success because 
they affront "the beliefs and prepossessions of our common experience, common 
sense, and common moral consciousness"; they" require our consent to positions 
50 illiberal, or eccentric, or perverse that they incite counterbeliefs which inhibit 
the ungrudging 'yes' that we grant to masterpieces" (pp. 28-29). 
1 
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As Professo~brams is careful to insist, this is something quite different from 
a doctrinal barrier between work and reader. The latter may without prohibitive 
loss be waived. There is little new in his position, which sounds very much like 
that from which the neo-humanists objected to Wordsworth. The notable 
difference is that Professor Abrams is less open to the charge of separating content 
and form. His requirement of moral and experiential soundness is posited not 
as an end but as a means, as a precondition of artistic excellence. Though much 
can be said for this view, it is scarcely a solution to the problem. (Professor 
Abrams doesn't pretend it is.) We may ask for instance how it differs from 
Eliot's celebrated test of coherence, maturity, and fidelity to experience, which 
Shelley flunked so badly, and which, on closer scrutiny than it usually receives, 
seems only to beg the question. To assume an experiential community among 
readers is doubdess the best way of avoiding the dead-end of critical relativism. 
Yet an objecting relativist would be quick to draw evidence for his objection 
from this very book. Professor Bush, presuming that "full response to the 
Paradiso is available chiefly to Christians," shares the secular reader's diminishing 
enjoyment as he progresses from the first to the third part of the Divine Comedy 
(p. 42). Yet Professor Abrams, who describes himself as II an infidel in partibus 
fidelium" (p. 5), not only considers the whole work a masterpiece but finds 
that one of the most theologically assertive passages in the Paradiso (Piccarda's 
"In His will is our peace") can be II appreciated profoundly, independently 
of assent to its propositional truth" (p. 22). 
But for other and better reasons interested readers will applaud Professor 
Abrams' contribution (as did this reviewer on its earlier appearance in the 
University of Toronto Quarterly). Because it sets the relevant issues in their 
proper context of traditional criticism and aesthetics and because it distinguishes, 
by familiar illustrative examples, among various forms and levels of belief, it 
ought to be required reading for anyone who would enlighten us further. 
Professor Brooks of course explores the question within the organic formalism 
primarily identified With his name. And in view of the many current attacks 
on his theory-they range from the cogent to the downright uninformed-it may 
not be amiss to remark here that three of his collaborators (none of them" new" 
critics) accept without hesitation his familiar insistence that ideas in literature 
subsist in a mode of inner coherence, not external correspondence. None directly 
challenge it, though some imply or express important qualifications. Professor 
Scott for example notes the "incorrigibly referential thrust" of words (p. 112), 
which leads him to question especially the priority of the medium in poetic 
creation. This heuristic notion of composition is a corollary of the formalist's 
totally closed structure, whose very virtue of establishing literary autonomy 
ironically enforces critical silence. Drawing on Maritain's Creative Intuition, 
Professor Scott argues instead for the primacy of the poet's" vision," his intuitive 
grasp of reality, which is not whimsical but rather "in accordance with what 
are his most fundamental beliefs about what is radically significant in life ... " 
(p.123). 
Some readers are sure to bridle at Professor Scott's further conviction that 
this orienting vision is essentially religious. And even within the framework of 
his own thesis his flat declaration that "criticism itself must, in the end, be 
theological" (p. 133) seems unnecessary. His essay is valuable rather for recog-
+ 
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nizing our present need to define, in terms that do justice to Qur whole experience 
of literature, that obscure mid-position that the verbal arts occupy between nOll-
aesthetic discourse and the conceptual innocence of music. 
Professor Brooks himself raises the question whether in contextualist theory 
poetry "has not won its independence at the terrible price of having detached 
itself from reality" (p. 65). His answer reviews without surrendering the cardinal 
points of his long-held theory. But he also meets the related charge that structural 
coherence provides no criterion of appraisal: "Qur criterion for judging coherence 
... is ..• Qur basic pattern of human nature .... " Without a belief in this 
basic pattern, "the work of art is indeed incredible and monstrous" Cp. 71), 
a conclusion which, like those of Professors Bush and Abrams, seems at once 
irrefutable and insufficient as a solution. One recalls Eliot's observation that 
literature must be defined, but cannot be judged, by literary standards alone. 
But modern organic theory is no more successful than its less distinguished rivals 
in telling us how to apply the extra-literary human constants, or even what, 
exactly, they are. Nor can it of its nature do so, witness the fate of 'Vinters' 
attempt. 
Yet though the critics of Professor Brooks' persuasion have done much to 
focus attention on this puzzle, they have certainly not created it. It is a very 
real problem, always most insistent when criticism is at its best, when, according 
to Matthew Arnold, it is truly "disinterested." But never completely so. The 
authors of Literature and Belief remind us that literature is inescapably if 
mysteriously involved with values. A criticism whose disinterest has become 
sheer indifference will therefore not alone be incommensurate with its object, 
but, like the phantom of pure poetry itself, have attained only the futile autonomy 
of the dead. 
Wayne State University E:MERSON R. MARKS 
Literary Reviews and Essays by Henry James. Edited by Albert Mordell. New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1957. Pp. 409. $10.00. 
This volume reprints for the first time sixty-two reviews and essays published 
by Henry James in the years 1865 to 1884. None of them will compel any major 
reinterpretation of James as a critic, but each review is a characteristically en-
gaging example of James's critical practice. Accordingly, we must be grateful 
to Albert Mordell for collecting them, seeing them through the press with a 
minimum of error, and accompanying them with full factual annotation. Our 
debt to Mr. Mordell ends here, for his interpretative notes will not stand much 
scrutiny. 
These reviews are worth- having because they constitute the further adventures 
of a singularly attractive mind, a generous but firm critical intelligence which 
looks directly into the center of literary questions. They also supplement our 
knowledge of James's interest in several authors on whom he wrote at greater 
length-Turgenev, Arnold, George Eliot, Howells, Sainte-Beuve, Flaubert, and 
i 
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others. Except for the Arnold essay, which provides a rather formidable cata~ 
logue of the critic's virtues, these studies are all the more interesting because 
they are partial, tentative assessments and not final statements of tempered 
judgment. Most of them glance at an author's less imposing works-the poetry 
of Howells and George Eliot, Flaubert's Temptation of St. Antbony, Turgenev's 
Virgin Soil, some unrepresentative sketches by Sainte-Beuve; they therefore re-
quire James to stay close to particulars, to expose the specific grounds for his 
judgment. Such reviews as these are valuable illustrations of James's critical 
method and also indispensable {oomotes to the longer essays. A few of the 
reviews have the special attraction of strangeness-an unsparing attack on Hardy 
as an imitator of George Eliot, close critical evaluations of the dull piety of 
Froude and Kingsley, the rather startling observation that a book by Louisa 
May Alcott is likely to subven children, and searching examinations of such 
improbable subjects as Monnons, Indians, and communists. But when James 
attacks his proper subjects, when he states the problems peculiar to the historical 
novel or prophesies the literary biographer's preoccupation with minutiae, what 
he says is more fresh and pertinent than any remarks which any present critic 
is likely to make on these matters. 
James's first concern is always to hit off the precise quality of the author 
under consideration. He tastes, he savors, and then he proceeds to. make concise, 
accurate fonnulations which stand up extraordinarily well. Thus, he finds that 
Renan is delicate and pure but his fault is "intellectual foppishness." Taine is 
powerful but lacking in subdety; his images are stronger than his ideas. Gautier's 
style is perfect, but he has the mind of "an intelligent poodle." Daudet is 
"in two words ... the most charming storyteller of the day." Merimee's salient 
trait is "reserve"; he is "a sly fox ... not a writer of rich genius." Turgenev's 
"great quality" is "the union of the deepest reality of substance . . . with the 
most imaginative, most poetic touches." Hitting off the precise quality is the 
heart of James's method; it is the first and surest test of critical success. If 
the fonnulation is correct, it reveals the true and permanent properties of its 
subject. The next step is judgment, which may be of less permanent value, as 
James himself often recognizes. When James proscribes an author for a certain 
audience, notes that his own age has emphasized humor at the expense of sub-
limity, or regrets Stendhal's misfonune in being judged by "an English tribunal," 
he is aclmowledging the limitations of a particular upbringing, a par~cular 
century, a particular nation. If we wish that James cared more for Stendhal or 
Flauben and less for George Sand, we may take some comfort in James's 
historical relativism. If a few-remarkably few-of his judgments now seem 
deficient, he is no more than the creature of his time and no less than the most 
discerning critic produced by his nation in his century. 
In passing judgment, James invokes such criteria as form, verisimilitude, and 
intellectual soundness, but his ultimate decisions issue from the organ of taste-
the critical palate. Sooner or later, James raises the question of taste and its 
opposite, vulgarity. His adventurous palate is receptive to a great variety of 
writers. The versatility of his taste is best seen in little matters-when he appre-
"ciates the ingenuity of so fundamentally unsympathetic a man as Martin Luther, 
savors the II humor and point" of the paragraph in which Renan fancies himself 
i 
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as the master of slaves, enjoys the Oneida Perfectionists' odd allusion to free 
love, "one family relation." He is tolerant enough to entertain Julian Hawthorne's 
intolerance of the Saxons, but what he will not endure is Hawthorne's inadequate, 
unpersuasive expression of his intolerance. 
Morality has become the most vulnerable of James's criteria, but his moral 
judgments are as careful as any others he formulates. He often demands only 
that the characters of a novel exhibit a decent capacity for conscience. He is 
less concerned to find perfect dramas of poetic justice. But even immorality 
need not be a simple basis for condemning a book or essay. Of a narrative that 
reveals Sainte-Beuve to be II very little of a moralist," James can say: "To a 
serious mind it offers perhaps more matter for reflection than any of the other 
essays." He finds moral questions to be worth examining, and for that reason, 
exponents of unexamined morality, such men as Froude and Kingsley, win no 
praise from him. For James, as for the authors he admires, moral judgments 
must be hard won, never easily arrived at. 
Albert Mordell is a strange companion for an author of such delicate 'discern-
ment. He exhibits just that grossness of. taste which James has in mind when 
he assails "those who swallow without tasting." It would be hard to find an 
editor less suited to appreciate James. Fortunately, lVIr. IVlordell saves most 
of his misprints for his own annotation; he cites, for instance, a novel called 
The Sacred Font and such critics as O. F. Matthiessen, Richard Blackmuir, and 
F. R. Lewis. His writing is clumsy and inexact. He specializes in one-sentence 
paragraphs, of which my favorite is: "James also refers to Renan's urbanity." 
Naturally, Mr. Mordell does not know what to make of James's concern for 
style. When James sharply attacks a critic named G. B. Smith for failing to 
appreciate "the niceties of diction" and for using words like "spake," Mr. 
Mordell, who gets off an occasional" nay" himself, tells us what the real trouble. 
is: "James is captious because he differs with Smith in some literary opinions 
in which James is wrong." James records at length his carefully reasoned objec-
tions to Hugo'S Ninety-Three, but Mr. l\1ordell rejects them; James, he reveals, 
is piqued because Hugo" was a propagandist for radicalism." Elsewhere in this 
very book, James shows how little his political conservatism colors his literary 
criticism: he notes the decline in Wordsworth's writing after the poet turned 
conservative and praises Taine's indictment of l'ancie'll reghl1e. Mr. l\10rdell 
seems not to have digested these passages. 
Of course, Mr. Mordell is not a professional author or editor. He exposes 
as much when he claims for James" the right to write" or goes on to argue: 
"Reading about them does not make for worse reading." But Twayne Publishers 
is presumably a professional firm. I should like to know where its editorial 
staff was when Mr. Mordell turned in his manuscript. 
Brandeis University HENRY POPKIN 
